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1 RECENT DECISIONS

upon the entry of the escaped convict into the decedent's truck, a recovery would have been allowed under a recognized exception to
Mitchell v. Rochester Railway, that is, immediate physical injury.2 6
On the other hand, had the injury occurred at any subsequent time
within the unaccounted-for forty-five minute period, recovery would
have been denied. But whether liability was imposed because the injury was immediate or whether a new exception has been added to
the Mitchell rule does not clearly appear.
It is submitted that the Court should limit the immunity of the
state when liability arises from a breach of the aforementioned concept of duties owed to the general citizenry, for which no liability is
imposed, by allowing recovery where a foreseeable harm to a particular individual or group of individuals is involved.
One of the primary reasons for requiring immediate physical injury to permit recovery for psychic injury was to discourage litigation of unfounded claims where there existed a lack of evidence showing a causal relationship between the act complained of and the injury
itself. However, with the recent advancements in medico-legal processes, the evidentiary obstacles may be more easily surmounted. It
would appear, therefore, that the courts should abandon the requirement of immediate physical injury where the stimulus is only psychic
in nature.

X
WILLS -

INCLUSION OF TOTTEN TRUST IN TESTAMENTARY

DISPOSITION DEEMED CONFIRMATION.-Testator opened a bank account in his own name in trust for his secretary. The same account
was later bequeathed to the secretary. The widow, exercising her
right of election, sought contribution from the bank account, claiming
it to be part of the estate under the will. The Surrogate held that
the bank account is not subject to the widow's right of election because the will was a confirmation of the trust, not a revocation.
Matter of Phipps, 125 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Surr. Ct. 1953).
In 1904, the celebrated case of Matter of Totten upheld the
validity of a deposit ". . . by one person of his own money, in his own
,,1 Such a deposit, commonly rename as trustee for another .
ferred to as a Totten trust, is tentative in nature. It does not become
absolute until the gift is completed during the depositor's lifetime by
26 Mundy v. Levy Bros. Realty Co., 184 App. Div. 467, 170 N.Y. Supp. 994
(2d Dep't 1918); Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N.Y.

Supp. 39 (1st Dep't 1914).
1179 N.Y. 112, 125, 71 N.E. 748, 752 (1904).
trusts in 1 Scorr, TRusts 360 (1939).
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some unequivocal act or declaration such as transfer of the bank book
to the beneficiary.2 If the depositor dies before the beneficiary without revocation, or without some decisive act or declaration of disaffirmance, the presumption arises that an absolute trust was created
as to the balance.3 As long as the trust remains tentative, the depositor may destroy it, either by some act during his lifetime, 4 or by
a decisive testamentary disaffirmance.5 A Totten trust may be invalidated at the instance of the depositor's widow on the affirmative
showing that the purported transfer is illusory.6 However, "[t] here
is nothing illusory about a Totten trust as such." 7 Where the estate
is inadequate, the trust may be invaded to pay the debts 8 and funeral
expenses 9 of the depositor.
The courts have found no difficulty in settling questions which
arise under any of these categories. A problem arises, however, when
the court is asked to imply a testamentary revocation from an
equivocal act or declaration of the testator. Here, the intention of
the testator alone governs. Thus, a testamentary revocation was
found to have been intended where the testator made certain monetary
bequests which could not have been carried out without revoking the
Totten trust.10 Conversely, no revocation has been implied in cases
where the testator, without mentioning the account in his will, made
a monetary bequest to the beneficiary of the Totten trust." Further,
2 See Matter of Totten, supra note I at 126, 71 N.E. at 752; Morris v.
Sheehan, 234 N.Y. 366, 368, 138 N.E. 23 (1922).
3See Matter of Totten, supra note 1 at 126, 71 N.E. at 752.
4See, e.g., Matthews v. Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 208 N.Y. 508, 102 N.E. 520
(1913)
(deposits withdrawn and placed in another account); Hessen v.
McKinley, 155 App. Div. 496, 140 N.Y. Supp. 724 (1st Dep't), affd inern.,
209 N.Y. 532, 102 N.E. 1104 (1913) (deposits completely withdrawn).
5Moran v. Ferchland, 113 Misc. 1, 184 N.Y. Supp. 428 (Sup. Ct. 1920);
Matter of Schrier, 145 Misc. 593, 260 N.Y. Supp. 610 (Surr. Ct. 1932).
6 The transfer will be illusory if it is ". . . intended only as a mask
for the effective retention by the settlor of the property which in form he
had conveyed." Cf. Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 381, 9 N.E.2d 966, 969
(1937); Marano v. Lo Carro, 62 N.Y.S.2d 121 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd
nm., 270
App. Div. 999, 63 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1st Dep't 1946).
7 See Matter of Halpern, 303 N.Y. 33, 38, 100 N.E. 2d 120, 122 (1951).
8 Beakes Dairy Co. v. Berns, 128 App. Div. 137, 112 N.Y. Supp. 529 (2d
Dep't 1908); Matter of Weinberg, 162 Misc. 867, 296 N. Y. Supp. 7 (Surr.
Ct. 1937).
9Matter of Reich, 146 Misc. 616, 262 N.Y. Supp. 623 (Surr. Ct. 1933)
(beneficiary held entitled to proceeds of Totten trust less amount necessary to
pay creditors and reasonable funeral and administration expenses).
10 Walsh v. Emigrant Industrial Say. Bank, 106 Misc. 628, 176 N.Y. Supp.
418 (Sup. Ct. 1919), aff'd Imen., 192 App. Div. 908, 182 N.Y. Supp. 956
(lst Dep't 1920), aff'd nem., 233 N.Y. 512, 135 N.E. 897 (1922); Matter
of Mannix, 147 Misc. 479, 264 N.Y. Supp. 25 (Surr. Ct. 1933) (will directed
that the testatrix's funeral expenses be paid, a burial plot and headstone purchased, and that a sum be set aside for Masses); Matter of Beagan, 112
Misc. 292, 183 N.Y. Supp. 941 (Surr. Ct. 1920).
1 Meehan v. Emigrant Industrial Say. Bank, 213 App. Div. 807, 208 N.Y.
Supp. 325 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 241 N.Y. 564, 150 N.E. 556 (1925).
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it has been held that the creation of a testamentary trust naming as
cestui the beneficiary of an inter vivos trust1 2 (which was not a Totten
trust, however) does not revoke the latter.
The question of implied revocation was presented to the Court
in the instant case. Apparently, the Surrogate relied on Matter of
Rosso '1 as controlling authority for the proposition that the testamentary disposition confirmed the trust. It is to be noted, however, that
the trust in the Rosso case had been perfected during the depositor's
lifetime by delivery of the bank book to the beneficiary. Hence, the
situation involved a completed gift which could not have been affected
by any dispositive provision. Any statements made by the court,
therefore, concerning testamentary confirmation, were merely dicta.
The case of Wait v. Society for PoliticalStudy of New York City 14
offers a much sounder basis for the present holding. It was there
held, on facts similar to those of the instant case,' 5 that the beneficiaries took as cestuis que trustent, and not as legatees. The court
sustained its ruling on the ground that there was no evidence to rebut
the presumption that the trust became absolute upon the depositor's
death. The decision in the instant case could be upheld on the same
ground, without considering the question of confirmation. Nevertheless, the Court's conclusion, that a confirmation was intended, is the
only reasonable one under the circumstances.
It must be presumed that all men act with a purpose. The testator, in the present case, would have accomplished nothing by revoking the trust. He would merely have taken the money out of the
trust, placed it in the estate, and then bequeathed it to the very same
beneficiary. On the other hand, there is a good reason why the depositor would confirm the Totten trust by mentioning it in the will.
The most obvious motive behind such confirmation would be the
testator's desire to reaffirm the intent which he apparently had at the
time he created the Totten trust.16
No only is the present determination in accord with prior decisional law, but it appeals to reason- as well. A contrary decision
would have thwarted the testator's obvious intention. Such an interference with one's right to dispose of his own property as he sees fit
would be wholly unwarranted.

'12 Irving Bank-Columbia Trust Co. v. Rowe, 213 App. Div. 281, 210 N.Y.
Supp. 497 (1st Dep't 1925).
23146 Misc. 746, 262 N.Y. Supp. 861 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
14 68 Misc. 245, 123 N.Y. Supp. 637 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
25 In the Wait case, five Totten trusts were established. Three of the
accounts were bequeathed to the beneficiaries, while the other two were not
mentioned in the will.
26 See Kelly v. Beers, 194 N.Y. 60, 63, 86 N.E. 985 (1909).

